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To obtain import licenses for sugar and tea, prospective importers
in Mali were required to purchase a certain amount of domestic
output. The efficiency of this kind of arrangement relative to that
of a direct trade restriction such as a tariff depends on the policy's
objective and whether the protected industry is competitive or a
monopoly.
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The govemment of Mali, as part of its trade  If the protected industry is competitive,
liberalization program, substituted an import  linking arrangements are less costly than tariffs
licensing system for the state trading agency that  if the objective is to increase domestic produc-
had held import monopolies on a number of  tion or maintain a given degree of self-suffi-
products. To get licenses to import sugar and  ciency (defined as maintaining a particular ratio
tea, prospective importers were required to  of imports to domestic production). The reversc
purchase given amounts of domestic output.  The  may be true if the protected market is a mo-
volume of imports was thus "linked" to domestic  nopoly.
output of the imported products.
Price controls on the products subject to
Takacs investigates the economic impact of  linking arrangements dilute the effectiveness of
these linking arrangements under two domestic  the arrangements and cause disequilibrium in the
market structures:  perfect competition and  market between distributors and consumeis.
monopoly. The arrangements have an effect  Removing price controls before the linking
equivalent to that of a tariff when the tariff  arrangements in a liberalization program would
revenue is transferred to the domestic industry as  drive up prices for both consumers and produc-
a subsidy. The cost of these linking arrange-  ers, provide false signals, and possibly increase
ments to the country imposing them may be  the costs of adjusting to liberalization.
greater or smaller than the cost of tariffs, de-
pending on the policy's objective and the struc-
ture of the protected industry.
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1989  for  helpful  comments  on previous  drafts.I.  INTRODUCTION
As part of its policy  of trade liberalization,  the government  of Mali
decided  to dismantle  the  state  trading  organization,  SOMIEX,  which  had held a
monopoly  on the  importation  of milk,  sugar,  salt,  canned  tomatoes,  tea,  tobacco
products,  and  fertilizers.'
New  procedures  were  adopted  for  the  importation  of these  products. 2 These
procedures  involve  a  two-stage  process  in  which  a  prospective  importer  first  must
apply for an import  authorization  (autorisation  d'importation),  then, after
negotiating  with foreign suppliers,  freight and  insurance companies,  and
arranging  for credit,  may apply  for a  final  import  license  (titre  definitif
d'importation).
For two products,  sugar and tea, importers  are required  to purchase  a
certain  amount  of  domestically  produced  output  before  a  final  import  license  will
be issued. Importers  must  purchase  one  ton  of sugar  within  the  country  before
they  will  be granted  a license  to  import  one  ton  of sugar. For  tea  the  required
ratio  of  domestic  product  purchased  to import  license  granted  is  0.75. Similar
linking  arrangements  have been  used by Niger  and  Malaysia  for  rice3,  Iran  for
nylon and Colombia  for  hops.  Such a system  can also work informally. For
example  reports  indicate  that in Brazil  deals  are sometimes  struck  between  a
prospective  importer  and  domestic  producers  in  which  domestic  producers  agree
to withdraw  their  opposition  to  granting  an import  license  if the  prospective
importer  agrees  to  buy  a specified  amount  from  them.
This  note  investigates  the  incentive  system  facing  importers  under  a  linking
arrangement  a-id  their likely  behavior.  Section II analyzes  the impact  on
imports,  consumption and domestic  production  and the social  costs  under  the
assumption  that  all  of the  relevant  "industries"  (production  of the  product  in2
the domestic market, importing and distribution) are competitive, in the sense
that  there are  a large  number  of firms  involved  and nothing  deters new firms from
entering the market.  Section III focuses on the interaction of the linking
arrangement with price controls,  because the  products in  question also  have been
subject to  this  additional  regu'lation.  The  overlapping  regulations  pose  problems
of timing in the liberalization process.  Should price controls be phased out
before, after, or at the same time as the linking a Langement?
Analysis of the  competitive market structure is useful to clarify the
operation of the linking arrangement and set a baseline for comparison with
noncompetitive  market structures,  but it  may not  be the  relevant  market structure
in  Mali.  The complexity  of the licensing  system  and the  possibility  of arbitrary
decisions  on  import  authorizations  and  licenses  may  deter  entry  into  the
"industry" importing and distributing the product.  Moreover, for sugar, there
is only one domestic refiner of sugar, which would effectively constitute a
monopoly in refined sugar production.  Section IV investigates the  operation of
the linking  arrangements  when domestic  production  is  monopolized. The conclusion
is that the ranking of the policy instruments as a means of obtaining certain
objectives may switch if the domestic industry is not competitive.
II. LINKING ARRANGEMENTS WITH COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES
A.  A Model of the Linking Arrangement 4
Assume that there are firms that act as distributors of a product within
the domestic market.  All output and imports are marketed through these firms,
who both buy from the domestic industry and import.  Assume that the country is
small so that the world market price of the imported product (P,,)  can be taken
as given, that the imported product and the domestic good are identical, and3
that  both production and distribution are competitive industries.  Suppose that
importers  must buy one  unit of domestically  produced output to  receive a license
to import "r" units.  Thus r - M/Q,  where M is the quantity imported and Q. is
the amount produced domestically.
Assume  that quantity demanded is a decreasing function of the price to
consumers  (Pd)  and that the quantity supplied by the domestic industry is an
increasing  functior.  of  price  to  suppliers  (P.).  These  demand  and  supply
functions can be expressed in inverse forms as:
(1)  Pd  =  D(Qd)
(2)  P,  =  S(Q,)
Market equilibrium requires that  domestic  supply  plus imports  equal  demand:
(3)  Q,  +  M = Qd
Given the linking arrangement, M - ;Q,,  so:
(4)  (l+r) Q.  - Qd
The distributors are assumed to maximize profits from the distribution of
imported and domestic goods.  Let lower case m and q,  denote one distributor's
imports and domestic purchases, respectively.  Profits equal the differeT  ce
between the  buyTng and selling  prices, less  distribution  costs,  which are  assumed
to be zero.  Profits (II)  will be given by:
IT  - (P4-PF,)  m + (Pd-P,)  q,
Since for each distributor m - rq,,
rl  - (Pd-P.)  rq,  + (Pd-P.)  q.
Maximizing profit with respect to q,  would  4.mply:
(Pd-P.)  r + (Pd-P.)  - 0
or, rearranging,4
(5)  Pd - (l/(l+r))  P,  + (r/(l+r))  P,
Under  the  linking  arrangement,  distributors  would  be  maximizing  profits  when
the  price to consutmers  is a weighted  average  of world  and domestic  producer
prices. Equilibrium  prices  and  quantities  under  the  linking  arrangement  would
be determined  by the market equilibrium  cordition (4) and the equilibrium
condition  for  distributors  (5).
Figure  1  depicts  the  equilibrium  when  r-l  (as  for  sugar  in  Mali). S'  shows
the  total  amount  available  in the  domestic  market.  It is equal to domestic
industry  supply  (S),  plus imports  allowed  under  the  linking  arrangerent.  Given
that  r-l,  S' horizontally  doubles  S.  D is  the  domestic  consumer  demand  curve.
Given  (5)  and  r-l,  equilibrium  will occur  at  CL,  where  the  price  at which
consumers  would  buy that  quantity  lies  halfway  between  S' and  Pw. The  price  to
consumers  wculd  be Pd;  the  price  paid  domestic  producers  wo,uld  be P.. At that
price,  the  domestic  industry  would  supply  an amount  QL.  Distributors  would  be
willing  to  buy an amount  QL  (-ab)  from  domestic  suppliers  at a price  P.,  import
an amount  CL-QL (-bd)  at the  price  P,,  and  sell  the  entire  amount  CL  (-ad)  at a
price  of Pd. An increase  (decrease)  in "r",  the  ratio  of imports  to domestic
production,  would rotate S' farther to the right (left),  make the linking
arrangement  less (more)  restrictive,  and provide  less (more)  encouragement  to
domestic  production.
At first  it may seem counterintuitive  that  distributors  would  buy from
domestic  producers  at a higher  price then they charge  when they resell to
domestic  consumers,  but  they  are  willing  to incur  a loss  on domestic  purchases
because  those  purchases  allow  them  to  qualify  for  import  licenses  and  obtain  the
profits  from  selling  imported  goods. At the  margin,  the  loss  on an additional
unit  of  domestic  purchases  (P.-Pd)  exactly  cancels  the  gain  on  an  additional  unit5
of imports  (Pd-P.).  Also in total,  the profjils  from importing  and selling  at
the  higher  domestic  price  (area  ginl)  are  offset  by the  losses  from  selling  at
a  price  lower  than  that  paid to  domestic  suppliers  (area  abge).
B.  Cost  of the  Linking  Arrangement
The linking arrangement  causes distortions  and imposes  net costs upon
society  of a similar  nature,  but a different  magnitude,  as those  from  a tariff
or other  type  of quantitative  restriction.  Referring  again  to  Figure  1, if  no
purchase  of domestic  output  were required  to import,  and there  were no other
trade  restrictions  or transportation  costs,  price  would  be Ps,  and consume:s
would  purchase  Cp.  The increase  in price to Pd  causes  consumers  to cut  back
their  purchases  to  CL  and  results  in  a loss  to consumers  equal  to  area  eirj.
Under free trade,  producers  would produce  Q,. The linking arirangement
increases  producer  price to P.,  increases  output  to  QL,  and  results  in a gain
to  producers  equal  to area  abkj  and  a  production  efficiency  loss  equal  to area
blk.  Area  abge  represents  the  loss  to distributors  who  buy  at P.  and  resell  at
Pd.  Given that it is equal to the rents  obtained  by  importing  under license
'area  ginl),  which in turn is part of the consumer  loss,  distributors  can  be
thought  of  as intermediaries  who transfer  area abfe of the  consumer  loss to
domestic  producers.  The other part of the producer  gain, area efkj, goes
directly  from  consumers  to  producers.
Similarly,  the  production  efficiency  loss (area  blk) is a combination  of
direct  loss to consumers  (area  fglk)  and indirect  loss to consumers,  through
distributors  as  intermediaries  (area  bgf). The  linking  arrangement  has  the  s.me
effect  as a tariff  rate (Pd-P.)/P.  where  the  tariff  revenue  (-ginl)  is used to
subsidize  the  domestic  industry.
In  this  partial  equilibrium  framework  the  net  cost  of the  regulation  is  the6
sum of the production deadweight loss (area  blk) and the consumption deadweight
loss (area irn).  Rough estimates of the magnitude of the costs of the linking
arrangements for sugar in Mali indicate that in 1988 the annual cost of the
linking  arrangement  was about 1,678  Fcfa  per  year, or  about 5.75  million dollars.
Appendix A explains the calculations underlying this estimate.
C.  Policy Objectives and Alternative Policy Instruments
Bhagwati and  Srinivasan (1969)  have shown  that  the  optimal  policy instrument
depends crucially on the  policy objective.  A linking  arrangement could be used,
at a net social cost, to achieve a variety of policy objectives:  (1) increase
domestic  production  above  what  it would  be  under  free  trade;  (2)  reduce
consumption; (3)  reduce imports; and (4)  maintain a particular ratio of imports
to domestic production.  The relevant question is whether each goal could be
achieved at a lower cost by  using another policy instrument.  This section
compares the linking arrangement with alternative policy instruments such as
tariffs, direct subsidies, and consumption taxes, to achieve alternative goals,
such as maintaining a particular level of domestic production or consumption,
or limiting  imports to  a particular level or ratio  of  imports to domestic
production.
The linking arrangement depicted in Figure 1 increased production from Qy
to QL  at a cost of area blk plus area irn.  A tariff rate of (P.-P,)/P.  would
have the same effect on production, but would raise the price charged consumers
to P,,  which would cut  back consumption  to CT and create a consumption  deadweight
loss equal to area crm, clearly larger than the deadweight loss  with the linking
arrangement.  The linking arrangement increases domestic p-oduction at a lower
cost than a tariff, but a direct subsidy to the industry  would achieve the same7
production objective at yet lower cost.  A subsidy of P.-P.  per unit of output
would shift the industry supply curve downward to pass through point 1,  and the
industry  would supply  QL at price Pv. The direct subsidy  would avoid consumption
losses but the revenue to finance the subsidy would have to be raised in some
way, which may be difficult for a country with a fledgling fiscal system, or
might impose  distortions in  other markets.  If the  goal is  to encourage domestic
production, and if a direct subsidy is practically or politically infeasible,
the linking arrangement will achieve the goal at a lower cost than a tariff.
If the objective is to reduce consumption to CL,  a tariff rate of (P 4-P,)/Pw
would do so at a cost in  efficiency losses  of fsk  plus irn.  This is  a Iower  cost
than that incurred under the linking arrangement becatuse  the tariff does not
provide as large an incentive to increase higher-cost domestic production.  A
consumption tax at the same rate alone would be the least costly policy, given
that it would  reduce consumption to C!  while producers still face the world
market price P.  and thus maintain production at Q,.
Countries may want to control imports  for balance of payments purposes or
to  maintain self-sufficiency.  This  objective  could  be specified  as a  given level
of imports or as a given ratio of imports to domestiz production.  If the goal
is to maintain a given import level a tariff wil' do so at a lower cost than a
linking arrangement.  Figure 2 sets the two policy instruments  to result in the
same  import  level  (bd-st).  A  tariff rate of  (P,-P,)/P.  would  result  in a
consumption deadweight loss equal to area tru, and a production deadweight loss
equal  to area  svk.  Compared  to  the  linking arrangement,  the consumption
deadweight loss with the tariff is larger by the area tinu, but the production
deadweight loss is smaller by area sblv.  Since vl-un, and sv=tu, the cost of
reducing imports to a particular level must be less with the tariff than with8
the  linking arrangement.  In addition,  the tariff provides  revenue  to the
government while  the  linking arrangement transfers  revenue to  the domestic
industry, which may be in private hands.
If the goal is  to  maintain a given ratio  of domestic p.oductior,  to imports,
then the linking arrangement is the less costly policy instrument.  Figu-e 3
compares the linking arrangement (again  with r-l) and the tariff rate (P,-P.)/P.
that  would result in the  same ratio of domestic  production to imports.  Compared
to the linking arrangement, the tariff leads to  a smaller production deadweight
loss (area  cgf<area ahf),  but  a larger  consumption deadweight  loss (area  dl:i>area
ekj).  The extra cost of the tariff is equal to area deji less area ahgc, and
area deji must be greater than area ahgc.'  This result implies that a tariff
is a more costly method of achieving a given ratio of domestic production to
imports than an arrangement that links quota license allocations to purchases
of domestic output.
Given the relative rankings of policy instruments,  what are the possible
interpretations of  why the linking arrangement is  used in  Mali, and what policy
recommendations would follow?  If the relevant industries  were competitive, one
possible interpretation is that government's policy objective is to maintain a
given degree of import penetration, or ratio between domestic production and
imports, and that the linking arrangement is the  most efficient policy tool to
achieve that objective.  In this case  the stanc  I recommendation  that the
quantitative restriction (in  this case the linking  arrangement) be converted to
a tariff would increase the costs of obtaining the objective.
Another, more plausible,  interpretation is  that  the  government's  objective
is to increase domestic production,  but the use of the first-best  direct subsidy
to the industry is not feasible  because of the difficulties involved in raising9
revenue  or the  distortions  that  would  be imposed  in  other  markets  by the  revenue
raising  activities. Under  this interpretation  the linking  arrangement  is the
second-best  policy  to obtain  its  objective. In this  case  as well,  conversion
to a tariff  would increase  the  cost  of obtaining  the  government's  goal.
D.  Linking  arrangements  and  price  controls
The  discussion  in the  previous  sections  assumed  that  market  prices  (both
the  price  in  the  market  between  domestic  producers  and  distributors  and  in the
market  between  dis.ributors  and consumers)  were free to adjust  to clear the
market. For  the  products  subject  to the  linking  scheme  in  Mali (sugar  and  tea)
this is not the case because  both are also subject  to p ice controls'. The
existence  of the  overlapping  price  control  regulations  raises  a  number  of issues
concerning  the  net  ef;ect  of  both  sets  of  regulations  and  the  effects  of  removing
one s.et  of re-.1ations  but  not  the  other.
To in-.vestigate  these issues,  Figure  4 reproduces  the market-determined
equilibrium  under  the  linking  arrangement  from  figure  1  and  shows  the  impact  of
adding  price  controls. The  equilibrium  prices  and  quantities  with the  linking
arrangement  are  the  by-now-familiar  P.,  Pd,  CL and  Q;.
Suppose  that,  in  addition  to  the  linking  arrangement,  price  controls  impose
a ceiling  of P'  on the  price  at  which  distributors  can  sell  to  consumers.  Giver,
that  this  ceiling  is  below  Pd,  the  price  controls  create  a  disequilibrium  in  the
market  between  distributors  and  consumers. At the  official  price  Pd  consumers
would  be willing  to  buy  Cc'  at  the  controlled  price  but  domestic  producers  would
only  be willing  to  sell  Q2. Given  the  domestic  purchase  requirements  to obtain
an import  license,  only  CC  would  be available  in the  market. There  would  be an
excess  demand  of (CcL  -CCL).10
The two regulator- measures work at cross  purposes.  The price controls
reduce the divergence between world and domestic selling prices and thus the
gain  from  importing, so distributors have  less incentive  to purchase  from
domestic producers.  Domestic output would  fall to QL,  anid  the price paid
suppliers would fall to Pc.  Price controls dilute tne effect of the import
licpnse linking arrangement on domestic production, and thus reduce the costs
of the linking arrangement.
One interpretation  of why the authorities use both price controls and the
linking arrangements for tea and sugar is that they are attempting to  avoid the
consequences of one set of restrictions by imposing yet another.  The linking
arrangement drives the price to consumers above the free-trade  price, so if the
policymakers want to stimulate domestic production but also have as a  sepafate
objective keeping  consumer prices low,  they  are faced  with  a dilemma.  Using  both
regulations may reflect an attempt to achieve both objectives, or achieve an
administratively determined balance between them.
Any  attempt  to  liberalize  and  deregulate  in  the  face  of  overlapping
regulatory requirements must face the question of in  which order to remove the
restrictive  measures.  In the case  discussed here, the removal  of price controls
while the linking arrangement remained in  effect, would increase the price from
P'd  to Pd. If the intent  is to liberalize the trac'e  regime  and reduce, eliminate,
or phase out the protection to the domestic industry, this price rise would
provide a  false signal to the domestic industry as to the direction in  which to
adjust.  Temporarily higher prices may encourage additional investment in an
industry that will be reducing capacity as the protection is phased out.
On the other hand, if the linking arrangement were abolished first, the
price to the consumer would fall from PL  to P,,,  the price controls would beI1
redundant, and could be dismantled.  Thus if one objective of  the  government is
to keep consLumier  prices low, a program of liberalization might better ach'ieve
this objective if  the linking arrangement were abolished before price controls
were terminated.
III.  LINKING ARRANGEMENTS WITH MONOPOLY
A. A Model of Linking Arrangements with Monopoly
The discussion  of linking  arrangements  so far  has assumed that  the  industry
being  protected  is made up of  many  small firms which  individually have no
influence over  the market  for  the product  as a whole within  the  importing
country.  In the case  of  sugar in Mali,  there  is only  one domestic  sugar
refinery.  Similarlv in other instances  where these  restrictions  have been used,
there was only one producer of nylon in Irar.  and rice marketing in  Malaysia ;s
controlled  by the  goverEunielnt  rice  marketing  board.  This  type of  market structure
raises  the  question  of  whether  the  conclusions  above  about  the  relative
efficiency of the alternative  policy instruments  carry through if the structure
of the domestic market for the affected good is a monopoly.
To answer this question, suppose that there is  only one domestic producer
or supplier of the import-competing good.  Given the incentive system facing
distributors under the linking arrangernent,  the monopoly domestic seller can
exploit its market power to  maximize profits.  If the competitive distributors
are  maximizing profits,  equation (5),  above, showed  their  equilibrium condition,
which can be rewritten as:
(6)  p. - Pd +  r  (Pd - Pw)
Given that Pd is a function of the quantity demanded by  (1), and P.  can12
be assumed  to  be  given  for  a  small  country,  (6)  can  be thought  of  as the  inverse
demand function facing the  single domestic supplier under  the  linking
arrangements. It shows  the amount  that distributors  are  willing to pay the
domestic  monopolist  for  various  quantities  of output,  which is the  amount  for
which  they  can  sell  the  good  on the  domestic  market  (Pd)  plus the  value  to them
of the  r units  they  can  then  import  under  the  linking  arrangements.  In  essence
the  linking  arrangements  increase  the  demand  curve  facing  the  domestic  monopoly
supplier.
Figure 5  illustrates  the impact of  the arrangements  on  a  domestic
monopolist. The  domestic  demand  curve  for  the  product  is  D.  If r-l,  domestic
producer  output  must equal  one-half  of consumer  demand,  so the  price to the
consumer  and  the  domestic  producer  output  must  lie  along  line  segment  ij,  which
bisects  the  horizontal  distance  between  the  demand  curve  for  the  product  and  the
vertical  axis.  The  distributor's  demand  curve  for  domestic  output  is given  by
(6).  If r-l,  the  price  distributors  are  willing  to pay for  a given  amount  of
the  domestic  producer's  output  can  be  found  graphically  by  adding  vertically  (at
each output  level for the monopolist)  the consumer  price and the difference
between  Pd  and  Pu,  at that  output  level. The  result  is  shown  by the  dashed  line
DR in  Figure  5.
The  domestic  monopoly  would  maximize  profits  by  equating  marginal  cost  and
marginal  revenue,  given  this  demand  curve.  The  marginal  revenue  curve  associated
with the  demand  curve  DR  is the  dashed  line  MRR.  If  marginal  cost were given
by the  line  MC, the  monopoly  would  produce  at  QL  and  sell  to  distributors  at  the
price  P.. The  price  to consumers  would  be Pd,  and  total  consumption  of imports
and  domestically  produced  output  would  be CL.
Given  the  linking  arrangement,  distributors  buy  from  the  domestic  producer13
at P.,  buy in the  world  market  at P",  and  sell  both  domestically  purchased  and
imported  units  to  consumers  at Pd. The  distributors  incur  a loss  of area  abcPd
on units  bought  from the  domestic  producer,  but make  equal  profits  of cdef  on
imported  units,  thus  breaking  even  overall.  As  in  the  competitive  case  discussed
above,  the distributors  act as intermediaries  to transfer  the wedge between
domestic  and  import  prices  (which  can  be  thought  of  as  tariff-equivalent  revenue)
to the  domestic  producer.
B.  Objectives  and  Policy  Instruments  with  Monopoly
As  in the competitive  case, compared  with free trade, the linking
arrangement  increases  domes-ic  output,  reduces  imports,  and  reduces  consumption.
In  the  competitive  market  structure,  the  linking  arrangement  was  found  to  be  more
efficient  than  a  tariff  if  the  goal  is  to  increase  domestic  output  or  to  maintain
a particular  ratio  of domestic  production  to imports.  Do these  conclusions
follow  through  for  the  monopoly  market  structure?
In the  analysis  so far,  the  country  in  which  the  monopolist  produces  has
been  assumed  small,  which  implies  that  the  world  price  is  given  at P.. A tariff
would  increase  the  price  of  imports  by the  amount  of  the  tariff  revenue  per  unit,
but  imports  would  be freely  available  at  this  price.  The  domestic  producer  could
not charge  a price  higher than the world market  price plus the tariff,  so
marginal  revenue  for  the  domestic  firm  would  equal  P,(l+t)  at  all  output  levels.
If  the  objective  is  to  increase  domestic  output  to  QL,  a tariff  would  have
to be high enough  so that  marginal  revenue  would  equal  marginal  cost at point
g, or,  expressed  differently,  P.(l+t)-h  in Figure  5.  Domestic  price  would  be
lower  with  the  tariff,  which  implies  lower  consumer,  and  therefore  social  costs
of maintaining  the  chosen  production  level.  This comparison  implies  that if14
domestic  production is  monopolized, a tariff  is  a less  costly  method of  promoting
domestic production than the linking arrangement, however a direct subsidy to
the producer ot gf per unit produced would still be the most efficient of the
policies considered.
If the objective is to  maintaini  a particular ratio of domestic production
to  imports,  iii this  case a 1:1 ractio,  then the tariff would have to be large
etiough  to increase marginal revenue to the producer (Pw(l+t))  so that marginal
revenue  would equal marginal  cost along line  segment ij. Given the  specific cost
and demand conditions in Figure 5  a specific tariff  of nm or an advalorem tariff
of nm/P.  would raise the monopolist's marginal revenue under the tariff regime
so that it would equal marginal cost at point n.  This maintains the chosen
market share for the monopolist, but with higher levels of domestic production
and lower consumer prices.  Comparing the costs of the linking arrangement and
the  tariff,  there  is  a  tradeoff between  the  costs  of  encouraging  greater
relatively inefficient domestic output, and the gains from lower consumption
distortions.  The additional  deadweight loss from  the greater  output  would equal
area gnmf, while the consumer gain would equal area drs.  In the case shown in
Figure 5, the  extra production  costs outweigh the  consumer gains, so the linking
arrangement remains less costly than the tariff.  However, a lower and flatter
marginal cost curve would imply a smaller tariff, resulting in larger consumer
gains  relative  to  the  extra  deadweight  losses  from  relatively  inefficient
domestic output.'  This implies that the  existence of monopoly also may reverse
the rankings of tariffs and linking  arrangements as policy instruments  when the
objective is to achieve a given ratio of imports to domestic production.
Linking arrangements become more costly when the protected industry is
monopolized because  the linking arrangement increases the degree of monopoly15
power that can be exerted by a single seller.  The  economy suffers losses both
from the exploitation of monopoly power and from the distortions inherent in
the trade restriction.
The  comparison  of  tariffs and  linking  arrangements under  competitive
assumptions above indicated that the linking arrangement used by the government
of Mali may be the optimal policy instrument,  or at least the second  best policy
instrument, if  the  goal of the  government is to  maintain a given  degree of import
penetration or stimulate domestic production.  Given that the market structure
in the protected  sugar  industry can be  considered  a monopoly,  the  linking
arrangement  is less efficient than a  tariff if the government's goal  is  to
promote domestic production and may be less efficient if the government's goal
is  maintain a domestic market share.  Given these conclusions, it would be wise
for the government to consider elimination of these restrictions or conversion
to tariffs.
IV.  SUMMARY
As part of its program of trade liberalization, the government of  Mali has
dismantled the  state entity that  held import  monopolies on a number of products,
and has substituted an import licensing system.  To obtain a license to import
two  of these  products, sugar and tea, a  prospective importer  must purchase given
amounts of domestic output.  The volume of imports is thus "linked" to domestic
output of the imported product.
This paper investigated the economic impact of these linking arrangements
under two types of domestic market structure, perfect competition and monopoly.
Regulations that  require importers  to  purchase from  domestic sources  before they
can import have an effect equivalent to a tariff in which the tariff revenue is16
transferred to the domestic industry as a subsidy.  These regulations impose
costs upon the countries imposing them, but the cost may be more or less than
the cost of using tariffs, depending upon the objective of the policy and the
structure  of the  protected industry.  If  the  protected industry is  a competitive
industry,  linking  arrangements will  be less  costly than tariffs if the  objective
is  to  increase domestic  production  or  maintain  a  certain  degree  of  self-
sufficiency, defined as a particular ratio of domestic production to imports.
These rankings can reverse however, if the protected market is comprised of a
single producer.
Overlapping price controls and linking arrangements on the same products
dilute the  effectiveness  of the  linking  arrangements  and  result in  disequilibrium
in the  market  between distributors  and consumers.  Removal of the  price controls
before the linking arrangement in  a liberalization  would drive up prices to  both
consumer  and  the producer, providing  false signals and possibly  increasing
adjustment costs.17
REFERENCES
Bark,  Taeho,  and de Melo, Jaime,  "Export  Quota  Allocations,  Export  Earnings,
and  Market  Diversification",  The  World  Bank  Economic  Review, Vol. 2,  No.
3, 1988  pp. 341-348.
Bhagwati,  J. N., "On  the  Equivalence  of Tariffs  and  Quotas"  in  R.
E. Baldwin,  et. al., eds.,  Trade.  Growth,  and the Balance  of Pavents:
Essays  in Honor  of Gottfried  Haberler Chicago:  University  of Chicago
Press,  1965.
Bhagwati,  J. N., and  Srinivasan,  T. N., "Optimal  Inter7ent,.on  to Achieve  Non-
economic  Objectives",  Review  of  Economic  Studies,  Vol.  36,  No. 105,  1969,
pp.  27-38.
Corden,  W. Max.  The Theory  of Protection Oxford: Oxford  University  Press,
1973.
Jenkins,  Glenn  P. and Kwok-Kong,  Andrew  Lai, "Pragmatism  and Stability: The
Political  Economy  of  Agricultural  Pricing  Policies  in  Malaysia,  1960-1983",
mimeo,  Harvard  University,  Harvard  Institute  for  International  Development,
May 1, 1988.
McCulloch,  R.  ,  and  Johnson,  H.  G.,  "A  Note  on  Proportionally  Distributed  Quotas",
American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  63,  No.  4, 1973,  pp. 726-732.
Republique  du  Mali. Ministere  des  Finances  et  du  Commerce. Direction  Nationale
des  Affaires  Economiques.  "Note  sur  les  Procedures  D'importation  du  Sucre-
Lait-The-Sel",  mimeo,  Bamako,  16  January,  1988.
Republique  du  Mali. Ministere  des  Finances  et  du  Commerce. Direction  Nationale
des  Affaires  Economiques.  "Proposition  de  Strategie  Pour  la  Mise  en  Oeuvre
de;  Mesures  de Liberalisation  des  4 Derniers  Produits  de Monopole  de la
Somiex", mimeo,  no date.
Stryker,  J. D.,  J.-J.  Dethier,  I. Peprah,  and  D. Brean,  "Incentive  System  and
Economic  Policy  Reform  in  Mali"  Associates  for  International  Resources  and
Development,  Inc.,  mimeo,  June,  1987.
Takacs,  Wendy E.  "An  Analysis  of Domestic  Purchase  Requirements  for Import
License Allocation" in  Krosrow Fatemi and  Catherine Mann,  eds.,
Proceedings  of the  International  Trade  and  Finance  Association  1989,  pp.
95-107.
Takacs,  Wendy  E.  "Mixing  Regulations:  A Mixture  of Tariffs  and  Subsidies"  in
Krosrow  Fatemi,  ed.  International  Trade:  Challenges  for the  New Decade
New  York:  Taylor  and  Francis,  (Forthcoming).18
APPENDIX  A
This appendix presents some preliminary calculations of the cost of the
regulations on  sugar  importation and marketing  in Mali.  In figure  3, the
production  cost of the  linking  arrangement  was identified  as  the triangular  area
blk.  This deadweight loss (Dp)  is equal to:
DP  1/2  ( P.  P.)  (QL,  - Qf)
- 1/2  (P.  - P,)  (dQ/dP)  P/Q Q/P  dP
(Al)  DP  1/2  (P.  - PW) E, Q  (dP/P)
where Es is the domestic elasticity of s4pply of the product, and dP is the
change in the price of the product to suppliers if it  were to fall to the free
trade level.
The consumption cost  of the linking  arrangement  was identified as area irn.
This deadweight loss (D,)  is equal to:
DC  1/2  (Pd  - P.)  (Cf  - CL)
=  1/2  (Pd  - P.) (dC/dP)  P/C  C/P  dP
(A2)  D-  1/2  (Pd  - PW) Ed  C  (dP/P)
where Ed  is the elasticity of demand for the product and dP is the change in the
consumer price if it were to fall to the free trade level.
From information  currently available, the  landed  price of imported  granular
sugar in Bamako is 119,000 Fcfa per ton.  Taxes of 38,681 Fcfa are imposed, so
the selling price of imported sugar (P.)  would be 157,681 Fcfa per ton if the
taxes alone were applied.  The official sales price of granular sugar (Pd)  is
300,000 Fcfa per ton, and the factory gate price of domestically produced sugar
(P.)  is 254,780  Fcfa per ton.  Sugar consumption in  Mali (C) is estimated to be
39,000 tons per year.  Given the linking scheme, domestic production (Q)  would
be one half of consumption, or 19,500 tons.19
No estimated elasticities of demand for and supply of sugar in Mali are
known to  be available, so for illustrative  purposes  both are assumed to  be equal
to one.
Given this data and applying equations Al and A2, the estimated production
and consumption costs of the linking scheme and price controls is estimated to
be:
DP  .5 (254,780-157,681.)  (1) (19,500) (254,780-157,681)/254,780
.5 (97,099) (19,500) (.3811)
- 361 million Fcfa
D-  .5 (300,000-157,681) (1) (39,000) (300,000-157,681)/300,000
.5 (142,319) (39,000) (.4744)
=  1,317 million Fcfa
The total deadweight  'sses,  or cost of the linking .-rrangements  and price
controls is  thus 1,678  milliLn Fcfa  per  year, or 5.75  million  US dollars per year
at 1988 exchange rates.
These numbers must be taken as very rough estimates that illustrate the
potential  magnitude  of  the  efficiency  losses  involved  in  the  overlapping
regulatory controls on sugar marketing.  In the first place, they are based on
a guess of the demand and supply elasticities. They also ignore distribution
costs, which would increase the free trade price to the consumer and reduce the
estimated costs.20
ENDNOTES
1.  See  Republique  du  Mali,  "Proposition..."  for  an  explanation  of the  program.
2.  See  Republique  du Mali.  "Note..."  for  an explanation  of the  procedures.
3.  See  Jenkins  and Kwok-Kong  (1988),  for a description  of Malaysian  rice
policies  and  an analysis  of the  mixing  regulation  along  the  same  lines  as
the  approach  taken  here.
4.  Corden  (1973)  presents  an analysis  of  mixing  regulations  similar  to that
used here.  Similar  license  allocation  methods  have been analyzed  by
McCulloch  and  Johnson  (1973)  and  Bark  and  de  Melo (1988). The  model  used
here also  appears  in  Takacs  (1989)  and  Takacs  (forthcoming).
5.  Area deji  - (Pt-PW)(CR-CT)  - l/ 2(Pt-Pd)(CR-CT)
Area abgc - (PI-Pw)(QJ-QT)  + l/2(P.-Pt)(QX-QT)
Let (CF_CT)_C';  (Q 1-QT)-q'
The  extra  cost  of the  tariff  (X)  is thus:
X - (Pt-P)c-1/2(Pt-Pd)C  -(Pt-Pv)q  -1/2(P.-Pt)q'
Because  c'-2q'  and (Pt-Pv)-(Pd-P")+(Pt-Pj)
X - (Pd-Ps)  q' - 1/2  (P.-P,)  q'  ,
which  must  be positive  becau_e  (Pd-P")-(P.-Pd),  and
(P.-P,)  must  be less  than  (P.-Pd).
6.  See Stryker,  Dethier,  Peprah  and  Brean (1987)  for a description  of the
price  control  system.
7.  The reader  can verify  the  reversal  in the rankings  of the instruments  in
Figure  5  by working  through  the  case  with  a flat  marginal  cost  curve  that
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